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Abstract   
 
This paper looks into the changes of the black market premium   for foreign exchange in 
Zimbabwe. Generally, the black market for foreign exchange arises as a direct 
consequence of the adoption of exchange rate controls in many developing economies 
facing substantial macroeconomic imbalances. Despite its negative impact on 
Zimbabwe’s economy, this market has not, so far, attracted the attention of researchers. 
The research attempts to describe the functioning of the black market and find out the 
determinants of the parallel premium based on a stock-flow model as well as to 
investigate whether inflation Granger causes the parallel exchange rate. Estimated results 
reveal that the determinants of the black market premium are international foreign 
reserves, real exchange rate, lagged values of the black market premium, expected rate of 
devaluation, money supply and inflation. On the other hand, inflation and black market 
are found to Granger-cause each other during the period under consideration. 
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1 Introduction   
 
The causes, effects and policy implications of black market in foreign exchange, in both 
developed and developing countries have attracted attention in recent years as the 
expansion of this economy has been found to have adverse effects on the official 
economy
1. These effects are of particular concern to policy makers in developing 
economies, who are confronted with growing informal employment, parallel markets in 
goods and financial assets, specifically in foreign exchange, and capital flight (Degefa, 
2001).  
 
Although some studies (Lindauer, 1989) distinguish between the two terms, “parallel 
market” and “black market” in foreign exchange, this study will use the two terms 
interchangeably or synonymously. Robert Grosse (1991) pointed out that black markets 
in foreign currency have emerged in most countries since time immemorial mainly as a 
result of government controls on access to foreign exchange. These controls are initiated 
by an over-valued currency and in most cases these controls precipitates the foreign 
currency shortage leading to the development of foreign exchange black market. That is, 
a country with an over-valued currency (in most instances) fails to meet the demand for 
foreign exchange with sufficient supply. As a result, it rations the scarce available foreign 
currency and imposes controls on imports and exports, as well as on capital account 
transactions.  
 
Basically, the controls are imposed to try and protect government’s limited stock of 
foreign currency reserves. The need for this protection is in turn, stimulated by trade 
deficits and/or capital flight which result in net demand for foreign exchange at the 
central bank. It logically follows that once the government imposes restrictions and 
limitations on the holding foreign exchange or on transferring it overseas, demand for 
alternative sources for that currency emerge. Thus, government’s inability to meet the 
demand for foreign currency and its interference in the operation of the market has a 
propensity to fuel the creation of parallel market for foreign exchange.  
 
In most cases, as part of the controls, exporters are required to surrender their export 
proceeds (partly or wholly) to the government within a specified period of time after 
which appropriation is instituted. On the other hand, importers are required to acquire 
import licenses that are granted to individuals by selected government officials. An 
import license provides a better chance
2 for the bearer to access foreign currency at the 
cheap official rate. At the same time, capital account transactions are restricted to a few 
transactions carried out selectively through a limited number of officially authorized 
channels. These restrictions have however transformed normal economic transactions 
into privileges, creating economic rents that have benefited both the government officials 
who implement the policies and the few economic agents who enjoy the privileges 
(Nkurunzinza, 2002).  
                                                 
1 The black market in foreign exchange is variously referred to as the “underground”, “parallel”, “grey”, 
“street”, “unofficial”, “curb”, “fragmented”, “segmented” or “informal” economy/market.  
2 The ability of the importer to get the foreign currency at the official market will depend on its availability.  
   3
According to Dordunno (1994) development of parallel market for foreign exchange with 
a high premium indicates a basic disequilibrium both in the foreign exchange market and 
trade regimes and, as a result, involves substantial social and economic costs
3. The 
growth of foreign exchange parallel market causes the government to lose control over 
foreign exchange as more and more of the official transactions are diverted to the parallel 
market. At the same time, black market premium for foreign exchange functions as an 
implicit tax on exports, serving at once as a disincentive to export production and a 
source of hidden fiscal revenues (Pinto, 1988). To this end Elbadawi (1994: 488) pointed 
out that: 
 
“...the parallel premium is an important relative price influencing key 
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, the parallel market premium acquires 
importance not only from this direct linkage, but also as an important indicator of 
inconsistency between macroeconomic policy and the foreign trade and exchange 
rate regimes; this signaling role is likely to feed back into macroeconomic 
outcomes by influencing government policy and private sector expectations of 
such policy (e.g. expectations of devaluation). In addition to the often-cited 
efficiency costs associated with the dual regime, a high and persistent parallel 
market premium can substantially undermine the allocational role of the real 
exchange rate in the economy by exposing the credibility problem of 
macroeconomic policy”. 
 
Following these forward and backward linkages of the black market premium to 
macroeconomic variables, Elbadawi (1994) arrived at the following conclusion: 
 
“... a rising premium is shown to have negative impacts on official exports and 
foreign trade taxes, as well as a positive effect on capital flight. Therefore, a 
rising premium and expanding black market could have serious fiscal and 
commercial policy implications by squeezing the tax base in foreign trade 
transactions and by expanding the opportunities for large scale rent seeking 
activities. A high premium also aggravates the debt problem and the foreign 
exchange constraint through its effects on capital flight and the recorded current 
account balance. ... Controlling inflation could become more difficult under high 
premium regimes (p.508)” 
 
The negative effects of the parallel exchange rate were also echoed by Kiguel and 
O’Connel (1995) when they said the parallel exchange rate feeds back into the economy 
through illegal trade and prices. They went on further to suggest that large premiums 
have detrimental effects on official exports and hence on growth while providing only 
limited insulation from external shocks. World Bank (1994) indicates that a 10% 
                                                 
3 The parallel premium for foreign exchange is the percentage by which the parallel exchange rate exceeds 
the official exchange rate, i.e., Z = [(PE/OE) – 1]*100 , where Z, Pe and Oe, respectively, stand for parallel 
premium, parallel exchange rate and nominal official exchange rate. Following the division of Ghei and 
Kiguel (1992), a country is said to have high parallel premium when the spread between the official and the 
parallel exchange rates is above 35%, moderate premium when it is between 10% and 35%, and low 
premium when it is below 10%. 
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premium is likely to reduce GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points a year, while the 
impact wanes as the premium goes up and a 100% premium cuts GDP growth by 2 
percentage points a year, a high parallel premium for foreign exchange nevertheless has 
an adverse impact on economic growth. 
 
Although the general behaviour of the parallel foreign exchange market is similar within 
developing economies, there are differences among countries regarding the relationship 
between the size of the parallel market for foreign exchange and the macroeconomic 
variables. According to Ghei and Kiguel (1992), the relationship between the black 
market premium and the fundamental factors that affect it are expected to be clearer in 
high premium countries than in low and moderate premium countries. Besides, they 
argue that high premium countries are also subject to macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
Although foreign currency shortages have been a perennial economic problem for 
Zimbabwe since independence, the severity of the problem first came to light in 1987, 
before subsiding and reappearing again since 1993. Nevertheless, the black market 
premium was very small for the greater part of the 1990s, only to start increasing towards 
the end of 1999. By 2002, the country’s black market activities had grown in depth and 
breath to such an extent that the black market premium reached its highest percentage 
figure of 2898 in December 2002 and January 2003. Though the parallel market premium 
drastically declined in 2004 (when it had a monthly average premium of above 100 
percent), it has however been on a rising trend again since 2005 to date. Figure 1 depicts 
the black market premium for Zimbabwe since 1975. Overall, the country has been living 
with very high black market premiums for more than 7 years, that is, since the year 2000. 
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In view of the forgoing, the principal objectives of this study are: 
 
i.  To identify the determinants of the spread between the black market and the 
official exchange rates in Zimbabwe by adapting the stock-flow model.  
ii.  To examine whether inflation causes the black market exchange rate or vice 
versa, using Granger causality test. 
 
In an attempt to overcome the impact of an active parallel foreign exchange market on 
economic growth and in order to finally unify the official and the parallel exchange rates, 
many sub-Saharan African countries have been trying to reduce the parallel premium 
through devaluation and the adoption of auction exchange rate systems. Similarly, 
Zimbabwe since independence has been implementing a foreign exchange liberalization 
through devaluations. For instance, the Zimbabwean dollar (ZWD) was devalued against 
the United States of America dollar (USD/US$) by 16.5% (Dec 1982), 5% (between Jan 
– June 1983), 17% (July 1994) and 60% (1 Aug 2006), to mention a few examples. The 
government’s objective of integrating the ‘illegal’ black market for foreign exchange into 
the formal economy resulted in massive liberalization of the financial sector during the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was implemented between 
1991 and 1995, which saw a devaluation of the local currency in July 1994. Also the 
establishment of the auction system (which has been mainly financed by the inflow of 
exports proceeds) in January 2004, was intended to achieve this same objective. 
Irrespective of these policy attempts, the black market for foreign currency persists and 
has even permeated almost all sectors of the economy, from the informal to the very 
government departments.  
 
Despite the massive existence of this anomalous black market for foreign currency in 
Zimbabwe, no study has been done to characterize this market. This study is thus the first 
of its kind. As such, it contributes to literature which focuses on the dynamics of black 
markets for foreign exchange in developing countries using Zimbabwe’s experience. 
 
The presentation of this study takes the following form: The first section is introductory. 
The second part deals with the general background to the country’s black market for 
foreign exchange, determinants and macroeconomic performance. Section 3 details the 
econometric model used to determine the determinants of the black market activities with 




2.  General Background  
 
2.1   Zimbabwe’s Exchange Rate Policy Since 1980 
2.1.1 Pre-Independence  Exchange Rate Policy 
Prior to independence in 1980, Zimbabwe operated a dual exchange rate system, a system 
which had been put in place in 1979, with the Zimbabwe dollar fixed to the South 
African rand, and to a trade weighted basket of fourteen currencies which included the   6
US dollar, the British pound among others. This dual exchange rate system was however 
abandoned in March, 1980. The main reason behind the abandonment of this system was 
the fact that it had become unsustainable because of the realization that, although South 
Africa continued to be the country’s major trading partner, removal of trade sanctions at 
independence implied that Zimbabwe, in its exchange rate policy had to consider other 
new trading partners. 
 
2.1.2 Exchange  Rate  Policy between 1982 and 1990 
 
For the period between 1982 and 1990, the Zimbabwe dollar was pegged to a trade 
weighted basket of fourteen currencies (including South African rand, British pound , US 
dollar, the Germany Deutschemark, the Japanese yen and the Botswana pula), taking into 
account the inflation differentials between Zimbabwe and her major trading partners. The 
weight of each individual currency in the basket was determined by the total volume of 
trade (excluding gold and fuel) between Zimbabwe and the individual trading partner 
countries.  
 
A number of challenges were however encountered as a result of the above exchange rate 
system and these challenges include:  
 
1.  The exchange rate did not fully reflect the scarcity of foreign exchange in the 
economy mainly because of the fact that this exchange rate policy operated in an 
environment of an administered foreign exchange allocation.  
2.  Since the policy was operating within a restrictive environment, the Zimbabwean 
dollar was not convertible for current account transactions.  
3.  deliberate adjustments to the exchange rate to accommodate the inflation 
differential as in December, 1982, September, 1991 and January 1994 were 
effected in a short time period, not enough to allow the corporate sector to 
effectively plan for such changes.  
 
In short this administered exchange rate policy could not fully reflect the scarcity of 
foreign currency and could not reduce the scale of the parallel foreign exchange market, 
thus necessitating a need to liberalize the economy towards a market based environment. 
 
 
2.1.3 Exchange  Rate  Policy during 1991 to 1993 
 
The period between 1991 and 1993 saw the introduction of less restrictive exchange 
control environment in order to improve allocative efficiency in the foreign exchange 
market. Reform measures supportive of a move towards a market based exchange rate 
regime were implemented such as the Export Retention Scheme (ERS) which was aimed 
at approximating the market value of the Zimbabwean dollar. This scheme had however 
its disadvantages. Firstly its market was thin and segmented as it was restricted to 
exporters of goods and services (Holders of capital funds could not participate on the 
market). Secondly, the use of the Export Retention Scheme market exchange rate and the   7




2.1.4  January to June 1994 Exchange Rate Policy 
 
Beginning January 1994, the ERS market was widened so as to allow the market 
determination of the exchange rate on the local interbank market. In this regard, 
Corporate Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs) were introduced and the retention of 
foreign currency in FCAs was raised to 60%. This effectively introduced a two tier 
exchange rate system – one quoted by the RBZ and the other one determined in the inter-
bank market. The two tier exchange rate regime was however only required for a 
transitional period since use of two rates was bound to cause distortions. To avoid 
distortions in the economy and move towards a market determined exchange rate, it was 
imperative that these two exchange rates be unified with most restrictions on current 
account transactions removed and therefore, making the Zimbabwe dollar more 
convertible for such transactions. The convergence of the two-tier exchange rate system 
was formally achieved on July 2, 1994. Unification implied that the RBZ had to stop 
quoting its exchange rates and that all foreign transaction would be conducted on the 
basis of the market determined exchange rates.   
 
2.1.4  Managed Float Exchange Rate Regime July 1994 –March 1999 
 
Adverse balance of payments developments in 1997, particularly from the last quarter, 
combined with rising domestic inflation, exerted immense pressure on the exchange rate. 
As market confidence declined, speculative behavior about probable currency 
depreciations intensified. This led to prepayment of lines of credit, hoarding of foreign 
exchange and further attacks on the Zimbabwe dollar. These developments intensified 
from October 1997, as evidenced by significant build up of foreign exchange balances of 
companies at banks. Finally the currency collapsed on 14 November 1997, depreciating 
sharply by 31.4%% from Z$13.7/US$ on 13 November to Z$18/US$.   
 
2.1.5 Informal  Arrangement  with Banks March 1999- August 2000 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, in consultation with the Bankers Association, agreed on 
an informal arrangement which stabilized the exchange rate at Z$38/US$, in March 1999. 
The relative stability was also a result of declining import demand due to tariff 
adjustments, improved operational efficiency of the inter-bank foreign exchange market 
and a tight monetary policy. 
 
Nevertheless the arrangement to stabilize the exchange rate at Z$38/US$ showed some 
shortcomings from mid 1999 due to: 
 
  Continued poor export performance; 
  Expected international BOP support which did not materialize;   8
  High domestic inflation which reached 70.4% in October 1999 at a time when 
major partners’ inflation was averaging 7%.  
 
During the first half of 2000, the foreign currency situation deteriorated further and this 
led to: 
  Development of a parallel market, accounting for a greater part of foreign 
exchange transactions.  
  Significant build up in foreign payment arrears, from US$109 million in 
December 1999 to US$424.7 million by end of July 2000. This resulted in the 
suspension of BOP support to Zimbabwe and compounded the foreign currency 
situation. 
 
In light of the above factors, maintenance of the exchange rate at Z$38/US$ became 
unsustainable. 
 
2.1.6  Fixed exchange rate – 1 August 2000-19 February 2003 
 
The exchange rate, which was pegged at Z$38 against the US dollar, for over twelve 
months was adjusted to Z$50 in August 2000, against the US dollar (and was later 
adjusted to Z$55 in 2001). This was under the new exchange rate policy which linked 
exchange rate adjustments to changes in inflation differentials between Zimbabwe and its 
major trading partners.  
 
This exchange rate policy was introduced against the background of the following 
factors: 
 
  A break down of the informal arrangement between the Reserve Bank and 
Authorized Dealers to peg the exchange rate at Z$38 to the US dollar.  
  Closure of several gold mines, as a result of a combination of rising production 
costs and declining revenues (all gold miners are suppose to sale the gold to RBZ, 
whose price offer is sometimes below competitive rates).  
  Escalating foreign payment arrears; and 
  Rising domestic inflation. 
 
2.1.7  Export Support Rate 19 February 2003 – 12 January 2004 
 
An Export Support Rate of Z$800 per US dollar was introduced in February 2003 in 
order restore exporter viability and increase the capacity of the key sectors of the 
economy to generate foreign exchange. Government undertook to review the exchange 
rate on a quarterly basis in line with macroeconomic developments in the country and 
purchasing power parity with the country’s major trading partners. Although after the 
introduction of the export support scheme, monthly foreign exchange inflows improved, 
nevertheless, the capacity of exporters to fully benefit from the export support rate was 
undermined by high inflationary environment coupled with constraints on production.  
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2.1.7  Foreign Exchange Auction System- 12 January to 24 October 2005 
 
The Foreign Currency Auction System commenced on the 12
th of January 2004 and the 
system involved the auctioning of foreign exchange through a Currency Exchange – an 
independent body supervised by the Reserve Bank.  Nevertheless, the system was 
abandoned in October 2005 because it failed to achieve its intended objective of 
enhancing export viability.  
 
2.1.8  Tradable Foreign Currency Balances System 24 October 2005 – 
 
The Tradable Foreign Currency Balances System which was implemented since October 
2005 places more emphasis on market forces. Under this system, exporters and other 
users of foreign exchange sold foreign exchange in the inter-bank market at a market 
determined exchange rates. On the demand side, importers and other users of foreign 
exchange, bought foreign exchange from the inter bank at a market determined exchange 
rate. Thus under this regime, the country continued to operate a two tier exchange rate 
system with the inter-bank and the official exchange rate.  
 
 
2.2  Origins of Zimbabwe’s black market for foreign exchange  
 
Literature on parallel market for foreign currency in Zimbabwe is scant, so it is difficult 
to know exactly how this market started and evolved over time. It seems clear, however, 
that the dynamics in Zimbabwe’s black market for foreign exchange have followed a 
number of factors including political events, movements in international markets, 
government policy and other institutional factors. There are indications that the parallel 
market can be traced back to 1965, if not earlier than that. During the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) (1965 through to 1980), the country was placed 
under United Nations sanctions which meant limited foreign currency inflow into the 
country, resulting in foreign currency shortages then. Nevertheless, available data on 
exchange rates shows that, although the parallel market was present as far as January 
1975, the divergence between the official and black market rates only become important 
the first 10 months of 1987, before the two rates became more or less the same till end of 
1992.  
 
The premium however picked again at the start of 1993 until today. Although, the 
premium was averaging less than 1 percent between January 1993 and December 1999, 
the divergence between the official and parallel rates has since widened beginning 2000. 
In January 2000, the black market premium was 11.39 percent, reached its highest 
percentage figure of 2898.05 in the two months of December 2002 and January 2003. 
Tracing the history of the black market for foreign currency in Zimbabwe, at 
independence in 1980 the word ‘black market for foreign exchange’ was a vocabulary to 
the majority and a term whose meaning was the prerogative of the few enlightened and 
economists. However by 2000, the word became the talk of the urbanites and as of March 
2007, the term ‘black/parallel market’ has become an ubiquitous word that even the grade   10
one pupil and the very uneducated rural grand-grand parent can easily define and 
interpret it in terms of its effects on their day to day living.  
 
History of the ZWD indicates that the old Zimbabwean dollar replaced the Rhodesian 
dollar at par, which in turn had been adopted in 1970 as a decimalization replacement of 
the Rhodesian pound at a rate of 2 Rhodesian dollars to 1 Rhodesian pound (R$ 0.71 = 
US$ 1.00). At the time of independence in 1980, one Zimbabwean dollar was still worth 
more than the US dollar (ZWD 0.68 = USD 1.00), but the currency’s value has eroded 
rapidly over the years. On 26 July 2006 the parallel market value of the Zimbabwean 
dollar fell to one million to the British pound. The Zimbabwean dollar was 
redenominated on 1 August 2006 at the rate of 1 revalued dollar = 1000 old dollars. Also 
on 1 August 2006 the Government of Zimbabwe devalued the Zimbabwean dollar by 
60% versus the US dollar (see exchange rate history Table 1), from 101,000 old dollars 
(101 revalued) to 250 revalued dollars (Wikipedia). Table 1 provides a condensed 
historical value of one US dollar in Zimbabwean dollars
4, with Table A1 of the Appendix 
providing more information on the Zimbabwean dollar’s devaluation and the reasons for 
devaluation since 1980. 
 
Table 1: Historical Value of one USD in Zimbabwean dollars  
Date Official  Rate  Black  /Parallel/ Free Rate    Premium % 
1975 R$0.54    R$0.54  0 
1978 R$0.6788  (Apr)  R0.6788  0 
1978 (Apr)  Note 1  R$ pegged to US$   
1980   R$0.6595 
(Mar)   R$0.6581  -0.22 
1980 (Mar)  Note 2  R$ tied to basket of FFR, DEM, ZAR, 
CHF, GBP, USD  
 
1980 (Apr)  Note 3  Independence (1Z$ = 1R$)   
1982  0.7211 (Jan) to 
0.8708 (Dec) 
0.7244 (Jan) to 0.9195 (Dec)  0.46  (Jan)  to 
5.6 (Dec)  
1982  Note 4  ZWD devalued by 16,5%   
1983  0.94 (Jan)  0.96 (Jan)  2.2 
1983 (Jan – 
June) 
Note 5  ZWD devalued by 5%   
1983 (Aug – 
Dec) 
Note  6  Flexible basket; dual rates; 20% tax 
on outgoing payments 
 
1994 Note  7 Floating  official rate (Jul 1); dual 
rates; ZWD devalued by 17% 
 
1994 (Jul 2) 
to 1999 (Mar) 
Note 8  Floating official rate, dual rates; rates 
unified 1998 (Dec)  
 
1995   8.3752 (Jan)  8.3470 (Jan)   -0.3368 
1997  10.5 (Jan)  12.00 (Jan); 25.00 (Nov)  1.35 (Oct) 
                                                 
4 The country has over the years instituted other targeted supporting exchange rates, for instance there 
might be a separate ZWD: USD exchange rates for gold sales, tobacco sales, government transactions, fuels 
imports as well as the official and black market rates. Thus, sometimes, there will be at least six ZWD to 
USD exchange rates fully operating in the economy.     11
1998  37.25 (Dec)  37.15 (Dec) Unified   -0.28 





On 1999 March 31, the Official 
Exchange Rate was pegged at ZWD 
38 per USD; By 1999 (Dec) the 
parallel market had re-emerged  
2000  38 (Jan)  56 to 62 (Jul); 65 to 70 (Aug) 
In Aug 2000, the Official Exchange 
Rate was pegged at ZWD 50, then 




36.25 (Dec)  
2000  Note  10  In November foreign exchange 
bereaux were closed  
 
2001  55  77 (Jan); 145 (Jun); 350 (Nov); 
320 (Dec) 
39.8 (Jan);  
163 (Jun);  
536 (Aug); 
 481 (Dec) 
2001  Note  11  In June, the official became a 
crawling peg rate 
 




2002  Note 12  In 2002 the parallel black market for 
foreign exchange mushroomed  
 
2003 Note  13  In  February 2003, the official 
exchange rate was re-pegged at ZWD 
824 per USD 
 
2003 55  (Jan);  824 
(Mar) 
1,650 (Jan); 2,500 (Jun); 6,100 (Dec)  2898  (Jan);  70 
(Mar); 574 
(Jul); 640 (Dec)
2004  824 (Jan 1); 
4196 (Jan 12) to 
5730 (Dec) 
3,950 (Jan) to 8,400 (Dec)  12.3  (Jan);  1.5 
(Apr); 47 (De) 
2004  Note  14  In January 2004, semi-weekly RBZ-
controlled) currency auctions were set 
up to determine the official rate 
 
2005 5957  (Jan); 
17700 (Jul); 
84588 (Dec) 
8,250 (Jan); 40,000 (Jul);  
100,000 (Dec) 
38.5 (Jan);  
126 (Jul);  
162 (Sep); 
 18 (Dec) 
2005  Note  15  In November 2005, the regular 
currency auctions were discontinued 
and the RBZ announced that “market 
factors” would control the exchange 
rate 
   12
2006 99,202  (Jan); 
100,195 (Jul)  
150,000 (Jan); 575,000 (Jul)  51  (Jan);  468 
(Jul) 
2006 (Jan)  Note 16  Economists predict an unofficial rate 
of nearly ZWD 250,000 to the US 
dollar by mid-2006. 
 
2006 (01.25)  Note 17 
RBZ caps daily variance of official 
exchange rate based on volume 
traded. The ZWD is able to fluctuate 
(from its average rate) in a daily band 
of: 0 % (under USD 5 million); 1 % 
(USD 5 to 10 million); 1.5 % (USD 
10 to 15 million); or 2 % (exceeds 
USD 15 million). This effectively 
froze the official exchange rate. 
 
2006 (08.01)  Note 18 
RBZ revalues the Zim dollar. 1,000 
Old Zim dollars become 1 revalued 
Zim dollar. The official exchange rate 
is set to 250 revalued Zim dollars per 
1 US dollar. (Parallel rate soars to 









550(000) (Aug 01); 650(000) (Aug 
03); 650 to 700 revalued (Aug 24); 
700 to 800 revalued (Sep 08 - high 
volume transactions); 850 revalued 
(Sep 14); 1,200 to 1,300 revalued 
(Sep 28) or 1,500 revalued (Sep 28 - 
high volume transactions); 1,500 
revalued(Oct 11; 1,700 revalued(Nov 
5); 2,000 revalued (Nov 18); 2,400 
revalued (Nov 29); 3,000 revalued 





154 (Aug);  
350 (Sep);  
940 (Dec) 
2007  250 (Jan 1) 
3,000 (Jan 1); 3,200 (Jan 11); 3,500 
(Jan 18); 4,000 (Jan 20); 4,200 (Jan 
22); 6,000 (Jan 26); 4,800 (Feb 2), 
17,500 (Mar 16) 
 




2.3 Structure  of  Zimbabwe’s Foreign Exchange Black Market  
 
The parallel foreign exchange market, which is usually created in response to foreign 
exchange scarcity in the formal economy, is common in most developing countries. If the 
supply of foreign exchange in the official market is insufficient to satisfy the demand for 
it at the official exchange rate, excess demand for foreign currency is created in this   13
market. If the concerned body of the government does not react to this excess demand, it 
will result in the emergence of the black market for foreign exchange.  
 
In order to deal with foreign exchange shortages, governments of developing countries 
often prefer foreign exchange controls to devaluations or tighter macroeconomic policies 
in their endeavour to preserve international reserves. Extensive controls on foreign 
exchange limit the accessibility of foreign exchange on the official market, forcing 
would-be buyers to search for an alternative market source. This leads to the emergence 
of an illegal market for foreign exchange, which then grows and becomes 
macroeconomically important as the concerned authorities respond to deteriorating 
balance of payments by tightening and extending controls on foreign exchange to 
maintain an over-valued exchange rate (Degefa, 2001). Thus the black market exchange 
rate usually includes a premium that reflects pent-up excess demand pressures that 
foreign exchange restrictions are intended to contain. Jianping (1998) argued that it is the 
foreign exchange restrictions that lead to the emergence of the black market, whereas 
other administrative measures, such as import tariffs, import licenses, quotas, and so on, 
only exert some influence on this exchange rate. 
  
The operations of Zimbabwe’s black market for foreign currency are scattered throughout 
the cities, towns and growth points located along (but not limited to) the country’s major 
roads linking to neigbhouring countries, as well as border towns and tourist resort areas. 
Nevertheless, major cities such as the capital city, Harare and the second biggest city, 
Bulawayo house the largest share of these activities. For instance in Harare, there are five 
well-known areas, most of them given black market names (by black market participants) 
which are borrowed from notorious or famous international places and institutions. These 
places’ names arranged in descending order of black market activities are: ‘Roadport’, a 
famous place in Harare which house the station for buses plying international destinations 
to such countries as South Africa, Zambia, Malawi; ‘The Gulf’ (named after the 1991’s 
Iraq Gulf war); “Trade Centre” named after the famous International Trade Centre; ‘East 
gate’ and ‘Ximex Mall’. All these places are less than 800 meters away from important 
national institutions such as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the country’s top 
police station, Harare Central Police Station. Other black market centers are ‘The World 
Bank’, named after the World Bank, located in the country’s second largest city, 
Bulawayo; the tourist resort of Victoria Falls, Beitbridge border post (border with South 
Africa which serve road users to and from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Democratic of Congo 
(DRC), and Malawi), to mention but a few.  
 
 
Over and above these named places, black market activities for foreign currency have 
gone deeper such that some participants are now renting offices right in the centre of 
Harare to handle bulky sales and purchases (sales of above US$10 000). It is also argued 
that the parallel foreign exchange market activities in Zimbabwe have been important at 
various times in attracting the very government institutions, which ironically should be 
deadly ready to destroy it at any costs. This has resulted in Zimbabwean black market for 
foreign exchange structure, especially in the past few years developing into two levels, 
one a lower tier dealing with cash-to-cash transactions, usually involving small volumes   14
and unsophisticated dealers, and another higher tier involving the banking sector for huge 
transactions on behalf of the central bank, state enterprises and government. The 
following two quotations are testimonies to this two tier black market: 
 
“It emerged yesterday that the parallel market had developed into two levels, one 
a lower tier dealing with cash-to-cash transactions, usually involving small 
volumes and unsophisticated dealers, and another a higher tier involving the 
banking sector for huge transactions on behalf of the central bank, state 
enterprises and government. Market sources said government was on Wednesday 
(14 March 2007) on the market looking for US$1 million for unspecified 
commitments. At least two financial institutions had been given the mandate to 
scout for the foreign currency on a strapped market. "They are looking for US$1 
million in cash," a market source indicated. "We don’t know why they want it in 
cash — maybe someone wants his money in cash because of the government’s 




“The central bank has been buying from us for the past three weeks," an official 
with one exporting firm, speaking on condition of anonymity, told business digest. 
The report was yesterday confirmed by several parallel market dealers who said 
the market had been severely strapped for foreign cash because the central bank 
"was after all the foreign currency in the economy". "They are now driving rates 
on the parallel market," one dealer said   
(http://www.zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=16198 Friday 16/03/2007).  
 
With regards to composition of the actual foreign currencies traded on the black market, 
the United States dollar (USD/US$) account for more than 60 percent of all activities, 
followed by South African rand (ZAR) accounting for around 20 percent with British 
pound (GBP), Botswana pula (BWP) and European Union currency (Euro) accounting 
for the remainder 20 percent activities. The important of USD and ZAR in this market 
will be alluded to latter.  
 
 
2.4  Parallel Black Market Exchange Rate Determinants 
 
Peeping through the curtains of history, black markets in foreign exchange in many 
countries have arisen in response to government controls on access to foreign exchange. 
In most cases controls are imposed to try to protect government’s limited stock of foreign 
exchange reserves. The need for this protection, in turn, is caused by trade deficits and/or 
capital flight that result in net demand for foreign exchange at the central bank. Once 
government imposes the limitation on holding foreign exchange, or on transferring it 
overseas, demand for alternative source of that currency arises (Grosse, 1991).   
 
Although literature sites innumerable dimensions through which one can analyse the 
causes and determinants of parallel markets, Degefe (1994) grouped these factors into   15
three broad categories. He pointed out that the current account transactions, currency 
substitution and capital flight motives of the demand for foreign exchange by the private 
sector are the three broad causes of the black market for foreign exchange. On the other 
hand, Grosse (1991) classified his determinants into two broad categories: monetary and 
the existence of underground economy. According to the latter author, the monetary 
vicious circle is initiated by ‘excessive rate of monetary growth’ which lead to higher 
inflation in the domestic economy relative to trading partners. This will result in 
increased demand for foreign currencies by citizens to buy relatively cheaper foreign 
goods and   to hold wealth in more stable currencies. At the same time investors’ 
confidence in economic prospects of the country becomes weaker, prompting them to 
consider and transfer their investments to other countries (and therefore other currencies), 
creating excess demand for foreign currency and contributes to the capital flight.  
 
Grosse (1991) further argued that even in the absence of monetary factors explained 
above, a country may still find that goods produced locally are perceived as inferior in 
quality to similar goods produced abroad; and thus demand arises for foreign exchange to 
buy those high-quality foreign products. A second variety of reasons for development of 
black markets according to the same author (Grosse, 1991) is the existence of an 
underground economy in the country. That is, when some participants engage in illegal 
business activities – such as sale of gold, sale of contraband products and drug trafficking 
– then a need arises for financial services that circumvent the legal financial system.  
 
Nkurunziza (2002) delineated the analysis of the black market premium into three 
categories. Firstly, the “real trade” approach which emphasizes the fact that a parallel 
market serves mainly commercial purposes. Secondly, the monetary approach which 
focuses on monetary factors in explaining the parallel market. Lastly, the portfolio 
balance approach, also called currency substitution approach, which is based on the 
assumption that agents use the parallel market to alter the composition of their assets 
between domestic and foreign currency. 
 
Although Zimbabwe’s parallel market for foreign currency fit into the three authors’ 
respective broad determinants (N.B. these authors’ broad category determinants overlap), 
Zimbabwe’s parallel market dealings became hectic, as the intensifying political 
instability and macroeconomic instability pushed money out of the country following the 
controversial land reform since 1999; and most importantly the fact that the country been 
increasingly isolated from the international community. For instance, Zimbabwe 
withdrew from the British Commonwealth in 2003 and this has resulted in both the 
World Bank and IMF suspending all programs of assistance. The section below classifies 
the sources and determinants of Zimbabwe’s foreign currency black markets in detail by 
broadly dichotomizing them into demand and supply sides. 
 
 
2.4.1 Demand  Side 
 
The demand side of the Zimbabwean black market for foreign currency has (and continue 
to be) equally dominated by both private individuals, firms and public organizations.    16
 
 
i)  Domestic residents going abroad  
 
People, especially the young people in big cities such as Harare, Bulawayo to mention a 
few areas, want to go abroad to study and work. If they intend to study in the United 
States, for example, they need to pass the TOEFL test which has an application fee of 
above US$10. Those who want to go to UK and South Africa to study have to defray 
tuition payments in sums of thousands of British pounds and South African rands. Other 
individuals may be purchasing South African rands to go for medical treatment. Given 
the shortage of both drugs and medical specialists in Zimbabwean hospitals, acute 
medical problems are referred to South Africa.  Since the government does not provide 
the needed foreign currency, they resort to the black market.  
 
 
ii) Currency  Substitution 
 
The portfolio balance approach, also called currency substitution approach, argues that 
agents use the parallel market to alter the composition of their assets between domestic 
and foreign currency. This has been happening in Zimbabwe especially beginning 2000 
as the economy has been hard hit by hyper inflation and macroeconomic instability. 
Black market activities have been exacerbated given that foreign currency has been used 
as an efficient hedge against inflation tax and domestic currency devaluations. Also 
expectation of inflation and negative real interest rates has lured people to switch 
Zimbabwean dollars to foreign currencies to preserve their wealth. 
 
 
iii)  Capital Flight  
 
The hyper inflationary environment of the past 8 years, the macroeconomic instability 
and the uncertainty following the controversial land reform has resulted in capital flight. 
Although the country did put some policy measures as a means to curb the capital flight, 
most foreign investors have managed to transfer their investments to safe havens. Thus, 
demand from this section of the participants has also fueled the black market premium. 
 
 
 iii)  Enterprises 
 
Private and state enterprises resort to foreign exchange black market when they urgently 
need foreign exchange to import raw materials and equipment, since application for 
foreign exchange through official channels takes time, adds on extra procedure costs and 
at the end of the day (97 percent chances are that) one will not be successful in finding 
foreign currency through or from banks. Currently, most private enterprises whose 
production can not proceed without vital imports have ‘individual suppliers’ who supply 
them (the ones referred earlier as renting offices for the sake of black market 
‘businesses’). Other enterprises have engaged Zimbabweans in disapora who will be   17
intending to send foreign currency to Zimbabwe to buy assets such as houses, but who 
will not at all be willing to send the money through the formal bank channels. In such 
cases, the Zimbabwean private enterprise will clinch this deal by asking the diasporians 
to deposit the needed foreign currency (mostly US dollars) into the account of the 
Zimbabwean company’s overseas raw material supplier; and in turn, the Zimbabwean 
company will deposit (upon the condition that the diasporian fax the deposit invoices and 
the foreign supplier acknowledging receipt of the amount to the Zimbabwean company) 
Zimbabwean dollars black market rate equivalent to the diasporian’s Zimbabwean 
account or his/her nominee’s account.  
 
 
iv)  Financing of fiscal deficits and other international obligations  
 
Another important factor contributing to the parallel foreign market activities over the 
recent years centers on the role of monetary policy in financing fiscal deficits and 
payments of international obligations. These deficits have been resulting from reduced 
tax revenue due to the shrink of the tax base as most companies have been folding in 
recent years; and increasing unemployment due to company closures, thus causing a 
dwindling in the corporate and income government taxes, respectively. The Zimbabwean 
government has been financing these deficits by means of money printing, which has in 
turn resulted in high inflation and low or negative real interest rates. The resultant 
hyperinflation has encouraged currency substitution among other wealth defensive 
measures, thus indirectly aggravating the black market activities.   
 
Also in recent years, the country has used money printing as a panacea in resolving its 
international obligations. For instance, on 16 February 2006, the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe announced that the government had printed ZWD 20.5 trillion in order to buy 
foreign currency to pay off IMF arrears (Wikipedia). The combinations of this monetary 
expansion behaviour have resulted in even higher premiums in the black market.  
 
 
v)  Fuel sold illegally  
 
One of the off-shoot of Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic problem has been critical shortages 
of fuel, both in the public and private sectors. This has resulted in the emergency and 
mushrooming of black market for fuel (both petrol and diesel). Most sellers of this 
commodity (garages and individuals) have demanded payments in US dollars, arguing 
that they need USD in order for them to be able to order another supply. Most private 
enterprises and elite individuals have and are currently purchasing their fuel requirements 
from this market, fueling the demand for foreign currency on the black market.  
 
 
2.4.2 Supply  Side  
 
Equally, the supply side of the country’s black market activities constitutes private 
individuals, firms and public officials.    18
 
 
i) Domestic  residents 
 
This category includes interpreters, tourist guides, taxi drivers, and workers in hotels, 
tourist souvenir shops, and joint ventures. On the whole, this category does not have 
much of a share of the market. 
 
 
ii)  Remittances from emigrants coming/visiting back home 
 
Zimbabweans from UK, USA, South Africa and Botswana making trips to Zimbabwe, 
are versed in the domestic situation, and will not convert their foreign exchange at the 
official rate, but on the black market. In fact prior to visiting Zimbabwe, they make 
consultations as to the prevailing black market rates of the respective currencies they will 
be having, and prices for various goods/assets. Thus, they even make their Zimbabwean 
budgets whilst still abroad using the black market rates. 
 
 
iii)  Remittances from overseas emigrants   
 
This category provides a relatively large share of the foreign exchange for the black 
market. Remittances usually do not go through official channels. They are different ways 
that are used to avoid official regulations since the official exchange rate is lower. For 
instance, most overseas emigrants normally send whatever amounts to their relative 
through Western Money Union in Botswana. Given that Botswana’s main cities 
(Francistown and Gaborone) are closer to Zimbabwe, that Botswana does not require 
travelers’ visas (as South Africa do) and the fact that Botswana has monetary policy 
which allows payments in USD, this country has become one of the most popular route to 
receive remittances in this category. Besides Botswana, Zambia has also been used since 
it has similar advantageous conditions as Botswana. Whether one receives the money in 
US dollars, or British pounds or Botswana pula, it does not matter, as long as it is one of 
these strong foreign currencies.   
 
 
iv)  Companies that pay in US dollars 
 
Companies (mostly non-governmental organizations – NGOs) that pay their employees in 
foreign currency (mostly US dollars) have been another source of foreign currency for 
the black market activities. Although some do not pay the employees directly in foreign 
currency in Zimbabwe, they have asked their employees to open Foreign Currency 
Accounts (FCAs) in which they deposit their salaries, and the employees in turn ask for 
travelers’ cheques from their banks which they will go and en-cash either in Botswana or 
Zambia.  
 
   19
v)  Cross border traders 
 
The macroeconomic instability in the country has resulted in higher unemployment 
(estimated at 80 percent in 2005) which has in turn forced the majority of the labour force 
to engage themselves in informal trading. One of the flourishing informal sectors has 
been the cross-border trading, with major destinations being South Africa, Botswana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and recently, Dubai. After selling their weirs, these 
traders return home with various kinds of foreign currencies, which they will obviously 
change on the black market.  
 
 
vi) Officials  returning  from foreign business trips 
 
After attending foreign business trips, most Zimbabwean delegates return home with US 
dollars which they might have been given as ‘travel and subsistence’. (In fact some 
Zimbabwean officials have of-late been described as non-spenders by their peer delegates 
from other countries). Once they return from foreign trips, they change their windfall at 
the black market. These officials include those in private and government departments.  
 
vii) Zimbabwe  Revenue  Authority (ZIMRA) Officials  
 
The higher import duties on some of the imported products have resulted in the 
emergence of contraband purchases or imports. To successfully avoid these high duties, 
most importers bribe Zimra officials in foreign currency. On the side of the officials, 
given the fact that their salaries are generally low, most of them will be ready to assist the 
importers to circumvent import duties, in return for a bribe. In fact, Zimra officials at 
border posts such as Beitbridge (one of the busiest border in Southern Africa which 
handles road travelers and cargoes from South Africa destined for Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Malawi and DRC; and from these countries to South Africa), among others are well-
known for bribery activities. Border posts such as Beitbridge, among others are well-
know for this. The severity of the bribery activities at this border resulted in the 
department firing some employees (from this border) in 2005 as they were said to have 
assisted importers to avoid payment of duties in return for bribes.  
 
viii) Border  buyers 
 
The beginning of the new millennium has also witnessed the development of permanent 
foreign currency individual buyers (whether for themselves or on behalf of other people). 
This is mostly witnessed at border posts such as Beitbridge. Although the government 
recently tried to curb the buying activities at this particular border in August 2006 by 
increasing soldiers and policemen at the post, there has been no real change. These 
security patrols have proved futile given that no extra incentive was provided amidst their 
low salaries and poor working conditions. To worsen the situation, some of the security 
patrols have joined the bandwagon by asking a ‘fee’ from buyers so as to allow them 
(buyers) to do their business freely. Thus a problem question of: who will guard the guard   20
has been the end result. After the buyers have accumulated the foreign currencies, they 
send them to Harare where there will fetch better return.   
 
 
ix)  Foreigners and tourists  
 
Given that most foreign visitors, whether on business or tourists know the acute shortage 
of foreign currency in Zimbabwe, against the background of higher retail shop prices 
(currently retailers price their products using black market foreign exchange rates), most 
of these foreigners change their foreign currency in the black markets.  Moreover, some 
embassy personnel have “permanent-contact” relations with black market vendors and 
peddlers through whom their monthly salaries (when converted into Zimbabwean dollars 
(ZWD) using black market exchange rates) can be raised by 6900
5 per cent or more 
during the peak periods. 
 
 
x)  Illegal Gold sales  
 
Since the late 1990s, illegal gold panning has been on the increase. This activity, 
popularly known in local language as ‘chikorokoza’ and the people who participate in the 
actual panning as ‘makorokoza’, is when the panners mine gold and sale, in most cases to 
other middleman. Since the price offered by the RBZ or its gold buyer subsidiary 
company, Fidelity Printers & Refineries is at most of the time lower than what will be 
offered elsewhere, most middlemen opt to sale the gold to South Africa. Given that such 
merchandise sale is not allowed by law, this becomes an illegal sale. The middleman will 
however get a better price in foreign currency, rands or US dollars which they will in turn 
off-load on the parallel black market.   
 
xi)  Informal Money Transfer Agents  
 
These informal money transfer agencies have increased since 2001, after the closure of 
foreign exchange bereaux. Normally, they are formed by a group of Zimbabweans 
(maybe 2 to 5 people) in the diaspora especially in countries such as UK and South 
Africa, to mention two countries. The agent will have the contact person or ‘subsidiary’ 
in Zimbabwe, mainly in Harare. Since the owners of the agent in the diaspora knows the 
areas where Zimbabweans live the various places in their respective foreign countries, the 
agent will advertise its ‘business’ and ability to help Zimbabweans to send money back 
home. To send money, one has to deposit the foreign currency with the agent at an agreed 
exchange rate which will be slightly lower than the black market rate prevailing in Harare 
at the time of sending the money. Once foreign currency has been deposited, the 
depositor’s relative in Zimbabwe will be asked to go and collect the equivalent ZWD at a 
specific place in Harare.  
                                                 
5 For instance, a person who earn US$100 as of March 16 2007 could have ZWD equivalent of ZWD25, 
000 (=250*100) at the official exchange rate; and ZWD1, 750,000 (=17 500*100) at the black market rate. 
Thus percentage difference between the amount in ZWD becomes 6900 (= ((1750000 – 
25000)/25000)*100).    21
2.5  An Overview of macroeconomic performance: 1980 – 2006  
 
Between 1999 and 2006, the country has been (and continues to be) facing its worst and 
severe socio-economic difficulties ever since her independence from Britain in 1980. The 
national economy or economic production activities (GDP) have cumulatively contracted 
by as much as 40 percent during this period (Wikipedia), while the annual inflation rate is 
currently the highest in the world, reaching 1 216 percent as of December 2006. Thus, 
hardships have manifested themselves in rising inflation, erosion of real incomes, critical 
shortages of both foreign currency and local currency, acute shortages of food and fuel, 
decline in savings and investment, capacity under utilization, company closures and high 
unemployment rate (currently above 80%). Direct foreign investment has all but 
evaporated. Rapid development of informal and parallel markets for both goods and 
foreign exchange are entrenching a growing shadow economy, with rising incidences of 
corruption in both private and public sectors. Price controls have been imposed on a wide 
range of products including food (maize, bread, steak), fuel, medicines, soap, electrical 
appliances, yarn, window frames, building sand, agricultural machinery, fertilizers and 
school textbooks. 
 
Although dealing with Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic performance requires detailed 
presentation of the movement in all economic variables, only trends in those 
macroeconomic indicators that have close relationship with the parallel premium for 
foreign exchange will be briefly discussed in this section.  
 
 
2.5.1 Real  GDP 
 
The economic growth path of independent Zimbabwe was relatively rose for nearly two 
decades. Although the economy did not grow consistently and exceptionally above 
annual average rates of 5 percent, almost for 17 years the country did registered positive 
economic growth rates between 1980 and 1998, except for the two years, 1984 and 1992, 
which recorded negative rates due to draughts. Since 1999, however, the economy made 
a u-turn in its growth trend and even up to today, negative growth rates year after year 
have been the norm. Although a number of explanations have been advanced to be the 
actual causes of these economic demise, to say that foreign currency shortage has been 
the sole causer will be a misrepresentation of facts. Factors such as the controversial land 
reform, which is assumed to have paralyzed the agriculture sector, especially the tobacco 
growing activities; the capital flight which followed after the land reform and the general 
political and macroeconomic uncertainties; and the massive company closures are some 
of the most important factors that have resulted in the 40 percent cumulative decline in 
the economy activities since 1999. The worse decline was in 2003 when GDP growth rate 
was negative 10.3 percent, while the rate declined to minus 5.1 percent by the end of 
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Table 2: Average annual percentage growth rate of macroeconomic indicators  










2000 2001 ‘02 ‘03  ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 
GDP   6  4  2.3  3.8  -7.3 -2.7 -4.4 -10.4  -3.8  -6.5 -5.1
M2  0.75 6.75 2.98 -8.7 32.4  46.8  129.6 -40.3 -66 16.4 na 
Gov Deficit  -2.4  10.2  3.6  -11  31 26 100  na  na na  na 
Inflation  13.5 11.8 25.9 32.6 55.6 73.4 133.2 365 350  237.8 1  216
M2/Oe  -20 0.12  -17 -33  14 18 130  -95  -95  -73 Na 
RER  10.45  -0.46  4.68 14.3  -23 -28 -57  na  na  Na  na 
Parallel Premium 
(actual) 
0.94  -0.33 -0.67 -3.6  36  481  2898 640  47  18  940 
IR  -2.5 -4.7 34.3 -6.1  -33 -63 10  Na  na  na  na 
Grant  2.4  10.2 10.2 -17 31  26  96  Na  na  na  na 
Mx 10.2  5.3  12.3  8.8  -17  -3.6  -0.77  na  na  na  na 
Cur Acc % GDP  -5.8  0.7  -3.4  -2.8  0.4  -0.3  -0.6  -2.9  -8.3  0.5  -0.5 
Sources: World Bank’s WDI and IMF’s IFS, RBZ, Zimbabwean Central Statistical 
Office  
Note: RER = real exchange rate; IR = international Reserve; M2/Oe = real money 
balance; and Mx = Merchandise exports. 
 
 
2.5.2  Fiscal Deficit, Money Supply and Price  
 
In a developing country like Zimbabwe, fiscal deficit has important linkages with the 
balance of payments and the money supply process. Normally, when fiscal deficit is 
financed through discretionary bank borrowing or money printing (seigniorage), it 
usually results in increased money supply. On the other hand, an excessive resort to 
foreign borrowing leads to over-valued real official exchange rate, deteriorating current 
account deficit, higher external debt and declining foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Government deficit for the period 1980 to 2006 was averaging about 59% of GDP per 
year. This signifies how serious the fiscal debt for the country has been (and continues to 
be). The rise in fiscal deficit during the first decade of independence is explained by the 
rapid increase in government expenditure relative to tax revenue, as the government was 
trying to address the inherited social imbalances from the previous regime. This saw 
massive infrastructure development in sectors such as health and education. The growth 
of the deficit between 1991 and 1995 can be attributed to such factors as the drought of 
1992/3 among other factors. Although on average the debt growth declined between 1996 
and 1999, the annual run away growths witnessed since 2000 to date can be attributed to 
government expenditures on such factors as the land reform, maintenance of 
Zimbabwean soldiers who were on ‘peace keeping mission’ in DRC, parliamentary and 
presidential elections (in 2000/2005 and 2002, respectively).  
 
Although money supply (M2) has been increasing for the greater part of the period under 
consideration (1980 – 2006), the serious increases have been witnessed since 1997 until 
now. In 1997, the government’s liberation war veterans grant appeasement was solemnly   23
met by money printing since the grant was not budgeted for. In the new millennium, the 
significant increases in money printing were mainly to cater for most of the government 
expenditures explained in the above paragraph. This monetary phenomenon is now even 
worse (at the time of writing) given that foreign money coming from doors have been 
totally shut and the country has been forced to use this option even for its international 
payment obligations. As evidenced in Table 2, one of the off-shoot offspring of this 
seigniorage spree has been the rampant inflation which has robed the country’s 
purchasing power.  
 
 
2.5.3  Foreign trade policy and its effects  
 
Regulation of foreign trade has been a key feature of the Zimbabwean economy. During 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) between 1965 and 1980, the economy 
was placed under international sanctions and the regime implemented import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI). This resulted in a sophisticated import control system being built 
up. At independence in 1980, the country inherited a heavily controlled economy and 
government pursued an import substitution development strategy, which saw it imposing 
several controls on trade, foreign currency inflows, interest rates, price and exchange 
rates. This policy seemed crucial in redressing the social imbalances that had been 
created by the war of liberation and the policies were meant to cushion the majority of 
citizens from any potential increase in prices.  
 
However, by the end of the first decade after independence (1980-1989) the Zimbabwean 
economy was already experiencing industrial inefficiency, low productivity, market 
distortion, increasing public sector spending and low rate of employment. Like many 
other developing countries, the country implemented a comprehensive trade liberalization 
programme in 1991, which was meant to reverse a long tradition of control in the 
economy. These reforms were referred to as the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP). The programme contained most, if not all of the elements of the 
orthodox Washington Consensus
6 and trade liberalization has been the main area of 
action. Trade Liberalization was designed to be gradual and implemented over the 1991-
1995 periods; however the implementation was very swift. Trade liberalization began 
with removal of selected input items from the quantitative import controls to Open 
General Import License (OGIL), which was introduced during the second half of 1990. 
These measures exerted great pressure on the balance of payment (BOP) and led the 
government to implement import demand management measures in 1991 which included 
raising the minimum import tariffs to 10% on all imported goods and an additional 10% 
on items on OGIL (Tekere, 2001). This clearly indicates that there were problems in 
                                                 
6 The Washington Consensus is a set of policies promulgated by many neoliberal economists as a formula 
for promoting economic growth  in many parts of Latin America  and other parts of the world by 
introducing various market-oriented economic reforms which are designed to make the target economy 
more like that of First World countries such as the United States. These policies includes: fiscal descipline, 
redirection of public exenditure, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a comparative exchange rate,  trade 
liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and secure 
property rights.  
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timing and implementation of some of the key policies during the programme, leading to 
implementation of measures that were contrary to the trade liberalization spirit such as 
increasing tariffs.  
 
With the phasing out of ESAP in 1995, the government was not eager to pursue economic 
reforms resulting in a 2-year gap between the implementation of Zimbabwe Programme 
for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), and expiry of ESAP. Most 
policies were reversed mainly due to poor macroeconomic performance, deficiencies in 
trade policies and sequencing of liberalization, fiscal indiscipline, exchange rate 
mismanagement, monetary policy mix and incompetence of economic managers to 
understand the substances and process of trade liberalization.  
 
In October 1998 government took a turnaround policy and increased tariffs on finished 
products with local substitutes or those considered as luxuries. In fact tariff duties on 
some imported products were increased to level much higher than those of the pre ESAP 
period. This was done in an effort to restore stability in the foreign market, curtail import 
pressure on the exchange rate as well as the need to generate revenue whilst at the same 
time protecting the local manufacturing industry. The rapid depreciation of the currency 
in 1999 was followed by the introduction of exchange controls which were meant to peg 
the local currency against major currencies .The government started to apply the main 
border taxes namely custom duties, import tax (which was essentially sales tax on 
imported goods) and a surcharge. Ever since 1998, the foreign trade policy of the country 
has seized to be predictable and policy reversals have been the norm.   
 
 
2.5.4  Export sector performance  
The country’s principal exports are basically low value-added agricultural commodities 
and minerals products. These include unmanufactured tobacco, ferro-alloys, gold, nickel 
and ginned cotton. Horticultural produce and fresh-cut flower exports are growing 
rapidly. The tourism sector has, over the last few years, increasingly become an important 
earner of foreign currency. Manufactured exports cover all the industrial products. 
Zimbabwe’s principal imports are chemicals, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, 
manufactured goods and petroleum products. 
Generally, the export sector performed relatively well for nearly two decades since 
independence (of course with the exception of some years like 1987 when they were 
negatively affected by foreign currency shortages for importation of raw materials). 
Nevertheless, the beginning of the new millennium saw a rapid decline in export 
performance. The same factors that have been attributed to declining in the GDP also 
contributed to the demise of this sector. The land reform and invasions are said to have 
displaced the commercial farmers who were the main producer of agricultural export 
products like tobacco, among other export crops. The tobacco export sector has been 
heavily affected to the extent that the country lost its world position of being the second 
tobacco supply after Brazil to a position outside the top five. Irrespective of this massive 
decline, the sub-sector has been and continues to be the highest foreign currency earner   25
for the economy. On the other hand the shortage of foreign currency to purchase vital 
production raw materials in recent years has also contributed to the demise of the overall 
export sector.  
3  The Model  
3.1  The premium model 
 
A number of models have been applied by various authors to determine the black market 
premium for foreign exchange. This paper will adapt the Kiguel and O’Connel (1994)’s 
stock-flow model, although with some modifications




LogZ = β0 + β1RER + β2LogIR + β3LogInfl + β4LogZ (-1) + β5DEV + β6LogM2 + et..(1) 
 
            Β3, β4, β5 β6 > 0; β1, β2 <0 
 
where     Z         = black market premium for (US$) foreign exchange 
               RER   = real exchange rate 
     IR       = international reserves 
     Infl     = inflation rate 
     Z (-1) = lag parallel premium for (US$) foreign exchange  
     DEV  = expected rate of devaluation  
     M2     = money supply  
 
Premium models predict that the black market exchange rate is positively correlated with 
inflation. Due to government finance conditions, the domestic money stock is 
endogenized for it plays an important role for the fiscal deficit. The strong link between 
fiscal deficit and money growth in Zimbabwe, especially since 1997 suggests that over-
expansionary fiscal policy is often at the heart of foreign exchange parallel markets with 
high premiums. Thus high fiscal deficits produce rapid money growth, which results in 
high rates of inflation causing high parallel premium for foreign exchange. The real 
exchange rate affects the premium rate indirectly and is assumed to have negative effect. 
 
In Zimbabwe, we expect the short-term determinant to be the expected rate of 
devaluation, in view of the discussions of the country’s monetary history, especially the 
frequency of devaluations. This variable captures the dynamics in the black market better 
than the interest parity differential because the atomicity of foreign currency buyers in the 
                                                 
7 This model is modified in the sense that (a) international reserve is included as an explanatory variable 
and (b) the stock-flow model developed by Kiguel and O’Connel (1994) is stated as a partial adjustment 
model that has been found to have, among other things, multicollinearity, hetroscedasticity and serial 
correlation problems. So the static regression model will be considered in order to examine the nature of 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the regressors in both the long run and the short run, 
provided that there is cointegration.  
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parallel market, their motives and the amounts involved do not suggest the existence of 
important capital outflows fuelled by the differential between domestic and foreign 
interest rates. Expected devaluations should have a positive impact on the level of the 
premium.  
 
The influence of international reserves is assumed to be negative. The link between the 
premium and international reserves shows that an increase in the level of international 
reserves reduces the demand for foreign exchange in the parallel market when the supply 
increases in the official market and thereby ends up in lowering the parallel premium. On 
the other hand, like the official exchange rate, the black market rate also follows a 
random walk. Nevertheless, previous black market rates have played an important role in 
determining the future black market rates and in the Zimbabwean situations, lagged 
values of the premium has thus been positively related to the current premium rates at 
any point in time.  
 
 
3.2  Inflation and the black market exchange rate  
 
The debate surrounding the relationship between inflation and black market for foreign 
exchange markets is broadly dichotomized into the neo-classical approach and the 
structuralist approach. The categorization of these two approaches is based on 
contemporary conflicting ideas about development issues in developing economies and 
the nature of their external sector crisis (Berge, 1995) 
 
The neo-classicalist belief holds that inflation affects the parallel market for foreign 
exchange in two ways. First, it causes the fixed nominal exchange rate to become 
increasingly over-valued, which in turn leads to an expansion in the size of the parallel 
market. Second, by reducing real domestic interest rates, inflation induces capital flight. 
In this regard, inflation may cause the parallel exchange rate to rise (Degefa, 2001). The 
structuralist school of thought postulates that if the parallel exchange rate rises or the 
official exchange rate is devalued, the demand for money increases due to an increase in 
the domestic currency cost of foreign exchange, which leads to a rise domestic prices.  
 
Therefore, the question of whether black market exchange rate (H) causes inflation (π) or 
vice versa in Zimbabwe is investigated empirically using pairwise Granger causality test. 
Through Granger causality tests, one can proceed to test for the direction of causality 
between the two series. Standard Granger (1986) causality test examines the role of past 
changes in inflation (π), in explaining the current variations in black market exchange 
rate (H). On the other hand, a reversed causality direction is determined by experimenting 
with variables π and H interchanged, using the following equations:  
 
 
   πi =∑∑
==
− − + + Π
i ii
t t i t i U H
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1 1 β α …………………….. (2a) 
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to determine whether or not πi do Granger cause Hi and vice versa, respectively. In terms 
of interpretation, H are said to be Granger-caused by π if inflation help in the prediction 
of H, or equivalently if the coefficient on the lagged inflation values are statistically 
significant. In our case, there are four possible causal relationships between inflation (π) 
and black market premium (H):  
 
i.  Unidirectional causality from π  to H;  
ii.  Unidirectional causality from H to π;; 
iii.  Bidirectional causality when π  causes H and vice versa; 
iv.  Independence when there is no causal relationship between π and H.  
 




4 Empirical  Analysis   
 
4.1 Data  definitions and sources  
 
The study employed annual time series data covering 1980 through to 2005 to investigate 
the statistical significance of the variables that relate to the black marker premium for 
foreign exchange. The premium is as defined earlier. Data on official exchange rate are 
the annual averages from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Data on both the parallel and official exchange rates (for the US$) 
are collected from Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). RER is the real exchange rate, 




* , where P represents Zimbabwe’s 
domestic price level (CPI), and P
w is the world price level (US wholesale price index). 
The series are from IFS. Data on both international reserves (IR) and inflation were 






E E − +1 , 
where E is the official rate of exchange (ZWD per USD). M2 is money supply and the 
series is taken from the RBZ.  
 
 
4.2 Methodology   
 
The econometric analysis in this study is three-fold: test for stationarity of the series used 
in the econometric model; test of the existence of static long-run equilibrium relationship 
between black market premium and its determinants; and development of a parsimonious 
dynamic model of the short-run relationship between black market premium and its 
determinants, which could used as the basis for design and assessment of monetary 
policy.    
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4.2.1 Stationarity  Tests   
 
The drawback to using non-stationary economic series in the study would be that the 
presence of deterministic time trends in any of the two rates could lead one to 
misinterpret what is essentially a pro-cyclical movement of the series over time for a 
deeper relationship between them. Thus to avoid inappropriate model specification and to 
increase the confidence of the results, time series properties of the data are investigated. 
Although there are a number of methods used to test for stationarity and the presence of 
unit roots, the methods used here are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the 
Philips Peron (PP) tests. By definition a series is stationary if it has a constant mean and a 
constant finite variance. A series Xt is said to be integrated of order d, denoted as I(d), if 
it must be differenced d times for it to become stationary
8. The ADF regression test can 
be written as: 




γi∆χt-1+ εt …………….. (3)  
 
Where t is the time trend, p is the number of lags; εt is a stationary disturbance error term. 
The null hypothesis that xt is non-stationary is rejected if λ1 is significantly negative. The 
number of lags (n) of ∆xt is normally chosen to ensure that regression residual is 
approximately white noise. Table A2 in appendix provides unit root test results and the 
tests indicate that all the variables are stationary at first difference, that is they are I(1) 
variables.   
 
 
4.3 Estimation  Results   
 
The estimation of the long-run static equation presented in Table 3 reveal that real 
exchange rate, international reserves, inflation and lagged values of premium are all 
significant at least at 10 percent level of significant. The elasticity of black market 
premium with respect to international reserves, inflation and its lagged values are -0.38, 
0.19 and 1.32, respectively. The long-run estimation indicates that the model fits the data 
well as evidenced by values of both R
2 and F-statistic tests which are above 94 percent. 
Thus, according to empirical tests in this study, the result shows that expansionary 
monetary policy in Zimbabwe (which is produced by high fiscal deficit) surface itself in 
higher inflationary trends, exerting an upward pressure on the black market premium. 
This result is in line with theory as well as with the general conclusion that over-
expansionary fiscal deficit is often at the centre of black market with high premiums.  
 
The fact that for Zimbabwe, previous black market rates have provided the basis for the 
prediction of future black market rates in an upward trend is reinforced by the positive 
correlation between the current and lagged black market premiums as shown in the 
results. On the other hand, the negative relationship between international reserves and 
black market premium is according to theoretical expectations.  
                                                 
8 Differenced series can be denoted by letter D or ∆ symbol, i.e., differenced inflation series becomes 
D_inflation or ∆inflation.    29
Table 3: OLS Estimation Results of Long-run Cointegrated Equilibrium Model of 
the Black Market Premium 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_Z (Sample 1980 – 2005)  
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-statistic  Probability   
RER -0.005  0.003  -1.76  0.09 
LN_IR -0.378  0.102  -3.72  0.002 
LN_INFL 0.19  0.07  2.71  0.02 
LN_Z2(-1) 1.32 0.182  7.24  0.00 
C 6.97  2.027  3.44  0.003 
R-squared 0.957290       
Adjusted R
2  0.947241 F-statistic    95.26   
S.E. of regression  0.184156       
 
The results from the parsimonious error correction model (ECM) are presented in Table 
4. To avoid any estimations bias from the results, the ECM model was tested for such 
econometric assumptions as normality, heteroskedasticity, serial correction and mis-
specification and these tests are presented in the appendix Table A3. Generally, the tests 
confirm that the shot-run model is statistically good. The statistical fit for the short run 
dynamic reduced form equation for black market premium in Zimbabwe appears to be 
good as indicated by higher values of both the R
2 and the F-statistic values. At the same 
time, as expected, the coefficient of the error term (ECMt-1) has a negative sign and more 
importantly that it is at one percent level of significance. This significant negative sign on 
the ECM ensures that the all the explanatory variables in ECM work together for black 
market premium to get to equilibrium in the short run. Thus the ECM results confirm the 
appropriateness of the error correction approach framework and that it should be used in 
conjunction with the long run equilibrium relationship for better policy 
recommendations.   
 
Table 4: Parsimonious single equation ECM of the black market premium 
  
Modelling ∆LN_Z by OLS (Sample 1980 – 2005)  
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-statistic  Probability   
ECMt-1 -0.24  0.32  -3.90  0.0014 
DLN_M2 1.12  0.30  3.70  0.0021 
DLN_Z2(-1) 0.91  0.23  4.0  0.0011 
DLN_INFL 0.26  0.12  2.42 0.0286 
DDVE -0.70  0.38  -1.86  0.0823 
C 0.007  0.04  0.16  0.8733 
R
2  0.898      F-statistic  23.8 
Adjusted R
2  0.85    
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4.4  Results of Pairwise Granger Causality test  
 
The Granger causality test is used to determine the nature of causality between changes in 
the black market exchange rate and inflation rate in Zimbabwe. To increase confidence of 
the results from this test, the test is based on both monthly and annual stationary data 
series for the period 1975(2) to 2006(12) and 1975 to 2006, respectively. The Granger 
causality tests presented in Table 5 (panels A and B) discloses that the direction of 
causality in both monthly and annual tests is generally bi-directional, from inflation rate 
to black market exchange rate and vice versa. Thus for Zimbabwe, these two series feed 
each other, and any meaningful monetary policy targeting the unification of the official 
and black market exchange rates has to be modeled in such a way that these two 
problems can be simultaneously dealt with.  
 
Table 5: Pairwise Granger Causality Test  
 
A: Monthly Data: 1975(2) – 2006(12) 
Null Hypothesis  Obs  F-Statistic  Prob 
  D_INFL does not Granger Cause D_PAR  368   9.0   0.001 
  D_PAR does not Granger Cause D_INFL    6.88  0.008 
 
B: Annual Data 1975 – 2006 
Null Hypothesis  Obs  F-Statistic  Prob 
  D_PAR does not Granger Cause D_INFL  30   185.5   1.0E-15 
  D_INFL does not Granger Cause D_PAR     296.5  0.0000 
 
 
5  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
The findings generally conform to both theory and the empirical results of other studies 
on African countries. Given the theoretical importance of the expansionary monetary 
policy, the study concludes that growth in money supply is one of the major contributors 
to the proliferation of the black market for foreign currency in Zimbabwe. The same is 
true with regards to high rates of inflation. The fact that the country has been financing its 
fiscal deficit by expansionary monetary policy over the years has not been only damaging 
by causing higher inflation rates, but also by propagating the black market premium. 
Generally, both long-run and short run models presented in this research, together with 
the respective econometric test that were done on them, indicates that these models best 
fit the data, hence their results provide the quantitative determinants of black market 
premium in Zimbabwe.  
 
 
5.1 Conclusion   
 
The study analyzed the determinants and effects of black market exchange rate for the 
USD and the resulting black market premium for the economy of Zimbabwe. As in other 
countries, the parallel black market in Zimbabwe has arisen in response to government   31
distortions in the allocation of foreign currency to economic agents. For example, 
sometimes the allocation has been made on the basis of import licenses, which in turn are 
accorded to a handful of importers handpicked not always on the basis of their economic 
merit, leading to inefficiencies, rent-seeking and smuggling. The management of 
exchange rate in the Zimbabwean case over the recent years differed from other African 
countries in that the country has been hard hit by very high black market premium rates. 
Though, attempts to seriously address the fundamental factors underlying the parallel 
market have been made by means of a foreign currency auction system in January 2004, 
the system has been abandoned due to lack of sufficient foreign currency to satisfy the 
requirements of the demanders. As a result foreign currency continuous to be sold on the 
black market even today and the market continues to thrive. 
 
5.2 Policy  implications 
 
The empirical results provides the following few policy recommendations. Firstly, the 
persistence effect of the premium is strong. It suggests that the black market has gone 
beyond being just tolerated by the government to becoming a stable institution, despite 
the fact that it is still officially “illegal”. The fact that some government departments also 
resort to the black market for settling ‘important’ foreign currency payment obligations, 
is in itself a death blow towards successfully eradicating this pervasive market. The 
research’s finding suggests that successful unification of the parallel and the official 
markets for foreign currency will require long-term measures, strong and sustainable 
enough to “destabilize” the parallel market. Given that trade liberalization polices and the 
auction systems to date have failed to rescue the economy from the evils of this market, it 
means that other policy strategies have to be employed. One possible policy strategy is 
the development of a more vibrant economy, as GDP growth normally reduces the 
premium in the long run. That is, economic growth which encompasses activities such as 
increased exports and foreign direct investments, to mention a few areas, means 
possibility of more foreign currency inflow, assuming other things constant.  
 
Secondly, a more predictable (and aligned) exchange rate will reduce the uncertainty 
associated with frequent devaluations of the domestic currency, given the positive impact 
of the expected rate of devaluation on the level of the premium. A situation where firms 
and other investors are unable to make their decisions on the basis of a stable currency 
will cause difficulties in attracting investment, whether domestic or foreign, depriving the 
economy of foreign exchange that would ease pressure on demand for foreign exchange.  
 
Thirdly, it is also a well known economic fact that exports are one of the nearly 
endogenous variables that any country can manipulate and use for its benefit to earn 
foreign exchange. Though export prices are exogenously determined on the international 
market, a country can still be able to reduce the scarcity of foreign currency by increasing 
its exports, both in quantity and quality terms through relevant export promotion 
strategies and state of the art production techniques, respectively. If Zimbabwe could be 
able to revive her export sector, much of the pain brought by black market maybe 
reduced to a greater extent.  
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Fourthly, another important factor which is a prerequisite for these policies to succeed is 
the restoration of the country’s long-term macroeconomic and political stability. Even if 
the authorities were willing to implement the trade and exchange rate reforms that are 
necessary for a successful unification policy, it will be difficult to achieve and maintain 
macroeconomic discipline in a hyper inflationary, politically polarized and 
sanctioned/isolated country. Reducing the country’s hyperinflationary environment and 
taking steps to mend the battered relations with the international community (among the 
array of ills to be corrected) would not only lay the basis for long-term development 
initiatives, but will also reactivate international cooperation with the country and boost 
confidence in Zimbabwe’s economy. Other countries have capitalized on expatriates, 
created systems and structures credible enough to attract investment by their own 
‘diaspora’.  
 
Lastly, although the study have pressed much attention on the policies suggested by 
material reviewed as well as the empirical results of the model, there are many more 
measures that will need to accompany the process of exchange rate unification in 
Zimbabwe. For example, unification will have to be marshaled in such a way that it does 
not generate excessive inflation. Other measures should include the government fostering 
a more competitive banking sector as well as general financial stability (especially 
following the financial crisis which hit the country, resulting in more than four banks 
placed under curatorship in 2004) in order to increase efficiency in the use of the 
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APPENDIX  
 








Rate  Reasons for Adjusting  
Dec-79 0.6742  -  0.11  currency  was pegged to the rand 
Dec-80 0.6306  -  0.1 
currency peg to the rand abandoned in 
March 1980 
Dec-82 0.9195  20%  0.17 
Adoption of Trade Weighted Basket of 
currencies Currency devalued by 20% on 9 
December 1982 
Dec-84 1.5029  36%  12.0%  Official  Devaluation 
Dec-90 2.6364  16%  14.0%  Official  Devaluation 
Dec-91 5.0511  92%  40.0% 
To current for inflation differentials between 
Zimbabwe and her Major trading partners 
Jan-93 6.0354 19%  45.0% 
To current for the cumulative impact of 
inflation therefore offset the Misalignment- 
moving towards unification of market 
official exchange . Rate 
Jan-94 8.4942 41%  18.0% 
Intro. Corp FCA's, lib of current account to 
bring exchange rate closer to perceived 
market rate, exchange rate devalued by 17% 
on 1.Jan 94 
Jan-95 8.3829     23.0% 
Market and official exchange rate unified in 
July 1994- adoption of market determined 
exchange rate system 
Jan-96 9.4509 13%  22.0% 
Adjustment to cumulative inflation 
differentials 
Jan-97 10.964 16%  19.0% 
Adjustment to cumulative inflation 
differentials 
Jun-97 11.391 4%  19.0% 
Adjustment to cumulative inflation 
differentials 
Sep-97 12.682 11%  19.0% 
Adjustment to cumulative inflation 
differentials 
Nov-97 14.556  15%  19.0% 
Adjustment to cumulative inflation 
differentials 
Dec-97 18.608  28%  19.0% 
Adjustment to cumulative inflation 
differentials 
Jan-98 18.235 -2%  32.0%     
Mar-98 16.139  -11%  32.0%       37
Jun-98 18.012 12%  32.0% 
Widening inflation differentials, poor export 
performance, low foreign exchange reserves 
Jul-98 19.135 6%  32.0% 
Widening inflation differentials, poor export 
performance, low foreign exchange reserves 
Sep-98 33.761 24%  32.0% 
Widening inflation differentials, poor export 
performance, low foreign exchange reserves 
Dec-98 37.369  11%  32.0%     
Jan-99 39.247 5%  44.0% 
Informal arrangements with the banking 
sector 
Dec-99 37.65  -4%  57.0% 
Informal arrangements with the banking 
sector 
Mar-00 38.153  1%  51.0% 
Informal arrangements with the banking 
sector 
Aug-00 55  44%  54.0% 
Official Devaluation to correct for 
overvaluation 
Feb’03 824  1398%  221.0% 
Introduction of export support rate to restore 
exporter viability 
Jan’04 4197.6 409%  623.0% 
Introduction of the foreign exchange auction 
system to restore export viability and 
enhance accountability of foreign exchange 
Apr’04 5200  24%  505.0% 
Introduction of Diaspora / export floor to 
enhance exporter viability 
Oct’04 6200  19%  209.0% 
Introduction of Diaspora / export floor to 
enhance exporter viability 
May’05 9000  45%  129.0% 
Introduction of Diaspora / export floor to 
enhance exporter viability 
Jul’05 17600 63%  254.8% 
Adjustment in line with inflation 
developments 
Aug’05 24025  6%  265.1% 
Adjustment in line with inflation 
developments 
Sep’05 26000  29.90%  359.8% 
Adjustment in line with inflation 
developments 
Oct’05  76002  6%  359.8%  Adjustment to reflect market forces 
Jan’06 99202  65%  613.2% 
Adjusted to reflect volumes of foreign 
exchange traded 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe  
 
 
Table A2: Univariate characteristics of all the variables  
Series Model  ADF  PP  Conclusion   
   Lags τ τµ ττ φ 3 φ1  Lags   
ττ  3 -2.39  21.7***  2 5.74 
τµ  3 -3.7** 29.2***  2 6.04 
 
LN_Z 
τ  3 -4.2***  ------- 2   6.28 
 
Non-Stationary 
  ττ  3 -1.12  1.95  2 -1.35    38
τµ  3 -1.76  2.5  2 -1.19  LN_IR 
τ  2 -0.56  ------- 2 -0.76 
Non-Stationary 
ττ  3 -4.06**  7.52***  2 -2.44 
τµ  4   0.58  4.39  2 -0.89 
 
LN_INFL 
τ  4 1.85  ------  2   1.64 
 
Non-Stationary 
ττ  4   0.29  8.38  2 -1.14 
τµ  4   1.44  6.3  2 -1.31 
 
LN_M2 
τ  4   0.99  --------  2   0.75 
 
Non-Stationary 
ττ  3 -3.73**  3.57  2 -2.12 
τµ  3 -3.53**  3.47  2 -1.85 
 
RER 
  τ  0 -1.90* ------  2 -2.01** 
 
Non-Stationary
ττ  3 -4.81***  5.18***  2 -2.73 
τµ  0 -2.81* 4.04  2 -3.05** 
 
DEV 
τ  0 -0.001 ------  2 -1.55 
 
Non-Stationary
ττ  2   -3.12**  5.98***  2 -4.23*** 
τµ  2   -2.23*  4.28**  2 -3.81*** 
 
∆LN_Z 
τ  4 -1.76* ------  2 -2.78** 
 
Stationary  
ττ  2 -4.39**  7.63***  2 -4.16** 
τµ  1 -4.19***  10.54***  2 -4.03*** 
∆LN_IR 
τ  1 -4.24***  ------- 2 -4.08*** 
 
Stationary  
ττ  3 -3.25  12.15***  2 -5.69*** 
τµ  3 -3.00* 14.44***  2 -5.51*** 
 
∆LN_INFL 
τ  3 -2.31**  ------- 2 -5.19*** 
 
Stationary  
ττ  3 -4.99***  6.29***  2 -4.55*** 
τµ  4 -3.05**  4.7***  2 -4.30*** 
 
∆LN_M2 
τ  4 -2.98  --------  2 -3.29** 
 
Stationary  
ττ  0 -5.31***  14.22***  2 -5.40*** 
τµ  0 -5.13***  26.13 2 -5.16*** 
 
∆RER 
τ  0 -5.15***  ------- 2 -5.17*** 
 
Stationary  
ττ  3 -3.63* 5.18  2 -4.66*** 
τµ  3 -3.81**  6.98***  2 -4.61*** 
 
∆DEV 
τ  3 -3.94***  ------- 2 -4.77*** 
 
Stationary 
*(**)[***] Statistically significant at a 10(5)[1] % level 
Key: ττ: Means Trend and Intercept 
         τµ   Means intercept     
         τ     Means None 
(LN_Z = log of the black market premium; LN_IR = log of international reserves; 
LN_INFL = log of inflation; LN_M2 = log of money supply; RER = real exchange rate; 
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Table A3: ECM’s Diagnostic Tests 
Test H0 
Test 
Statistic  p-Value Conclusion 
Jarque-Bera Normally  distributed  JB = 3.57  0.19  Normally distributed 
Ljung-Box Q  No Serial Correlation   LBQ = 2.26  0.89  No Serial Correlation  
Breusch-
Godfrey  No Serial Correlation  nR
2 = 4.88  0.09  No Serial Correlation  
ARCH LM  No Heteroskedasticity  nR
2 = 0.35  0.55  No Heteroskedasticity  
White No  Heteroskedasticity  nR
2 = 1.93  0.37  No Heteroskedasticity  
  
  Stability Test 
Test H0 
Test 
Statistic  p-Value Conclusion 
Ramsey RESET  No Misspecification   LR = 4.31  0.12  No Misspecification  
 
 
 
 